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Extra-legal ‘popular’ violence, whereby citizens kill 
other citizens ‘in the name of justice’, has occurred 
all over the world, at different times and in different 
places. However, there is a much higher incidence 
of such practices in some contexts than in others. 
The present-day eastern DR Congo is one of those 
contexts. Whether through violent mobs, or 
through ‘guns for hire’, those who are perceived to 
be ‘harming the community’ are sometimes killed 
without judicial process, but in ‘the name of 
justice’. How can we explain these violent 
practices? What do they tell us about the state of 
the justice and security apparatus in the eastern 
DR Congo? And what could be done to reduce the 
incidence of these irregular acts? 
This policy brief looks into the causes of what in the 
eastern DR Congo is commonly called justice 
populaire.
1
 Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, 
these incidents cannot only be ascribed to the 
malfunctioning state-led justice and security apparatus. 
Rather, they relate to a wider crisis of authority 
resulting in part from the eroding role of customary 
chiefs, religious leaders and elders. Other causes are 
the high level of social conflicts and the militarisation of 
society, which render violent responses seemingly 
adequate solutions to conflicts and other social 
problems, Additionally, justice populaire provides a 
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 A more in-depth discussion of justice populaire in the 
eastern DR Congo can be found in Verweijen (2015). 
way in which groups with limited access to official 
political channels, in particular the youth, try to assert 
socio-political agency.  
The multi-faceted nature of the causes of extra-legal 
violent ‘justice’ calls for multi-dimensional responses. It 
is only by reinforcing non-violent mechanisms of social 
and conflict regulation that this phenomenon can be 
diminished. In particular, the void created by the 
abolition of customary courts must be filled, and an 
open debate must be held about how to deal with 
accusations of sorcery. Furthermore, ways must be 
found to include in local decision-making those groups 
that feel alienated from the formal political and 
administrative domain.   
Analysing justice populaire 
Violent extra-legal ‘justice’ in the eastern DR Congo 
takes various forms. It often consists of a mob beating 
or stoning people to death and/or burning them alive, 
and is commonly accompanied by acts of property 
destruction, such as setting fire to houses and 
belongings. The targeted person may also be killed by 
a hired gunman, in which case the line the line 
between justice populaire and murder for private or 
political purposes becomes very thin. However, when 
born out of similar motives and perceived in a similar 
manner, such killings may still be considered as a form 
of justice populaire. 
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Crucially, the ‘popular’ nature of this type of practice is 
based on two logics . First, the person who is targeted 
is not seen simply as having harmed a single person 
or family, but rather ‘the community’ as a whole. 
Therefore, it is believed to be in the interest of this 
larger group to ‘neutralise’ the perceived threat. 
Second, the act of killing or other harm is either 
executed or approved by a large number of people, 
being seen for example as a punishment that is 
deserved, or as a way to restore harmony and order in 
the community. This ‘approval’ is, however, a highly 
complex notion, and often exists side by side with 
‘disapproval’, moral doubts and the feeling that it is a 
‘necessary evil’. Feelings about justice populaire are 
generally ambivalent, and tend to differ widely across 
social groups. Moreover, although termed popular 
‘justice’, opinions differ on whether or not it actually 
constitutes ‘justice’. In fact, many Congolese see it as 
a problem, due to the cruel nature of the way death is 
inflicted, the suspicion that many innocent people are 
killed, and the undue usurping of the power to decide 
over life and death.  
When looking at who is targeted by justice populaire, 
two categories predominate. The first is (suspected) 
criminals. These are often recidivists who have 
managed to avoid or escape justice, those caught in 
the act or those involved in crimes that provoke moral 
outrage. The latter may be due either to the nature of 
the offence, for example the rape of a minor, or to the 
nature of the victim, for example a locally well-known 
and popular figure. In some cases, the identity of the 
perpetrator also matters, such as when it concerns a 
member of the security services. In particular, 
Congolese army soldiers involved in criminal acts 
appear to be regularly targeted. The second category 
comprises (suspected) sorcerers. Suspicions of 
supernatural manipulation frequently surface in the 
case of unexpected deaths believed to be ‘unnatural’, 
for example those that involve young people. 
Responsibility for the death is often ascribed to 
relatives or neighbours, indicating that existing 
conflicts play an important role in sorcery-related 
accusations.  
Suspicions of sorcery are disproportionally projected 
onto women and the elderly. At the same time, where 
mob justice is concerned, youths tend to be at the 
forefront of the action. This indicates that both gender-
related and inter-generational tensions are at play in 
justice populaire. Although stereotyped as being 
‘weaker’, women in the DR Congo are often also seen 
as ‘dangerous’, and are therefore suspected of 
sorcery. This does not imply that women do not make 
sorcery accusations themselves, or that they never 
endorse and incite extra-legal killings in the name of 
justice: they can be both victims and instigators. The 
elderly, for their part, appear to be often targeted 
because the youth associate them with an established 
order against which they rebel. Not only do the youth 
consider current authority structures to be 
exclusionary, they also see them as deficient in 
providing public goods such as justice and security.  
Malfunctioning state-organised 
justice and security services 
The state-led justice and security services in the DR 
Congo function in a highly erratic manner.  They have 
insufficient human and financial resources, suffer from 
deficient infrastructure and logistics, and are riddled 
with complex power structures, often causing them to 
act according to patronage logics and to extract 
resources from citizens (Eriksson Baaz and Olson, 
2011). Such malfunctioning fosters extra-legal justice 
both directly and indirectly. One direct way is that 
perpetrators of crimes are often allowed to go free by 
the police or the judiciary, in return for payment or 
following pressure from those ‘protecting’ them. Others 
simply escape from prison in return for bribes or 
through prison breaks (Tekilazaya et al., 2013). Thus, 
it is not uncommon for the same criminals to appear 
over and over again in the same community, angering 
inhabitants and fostering the belief that there is no 
other way to get rid of them than by killing them. The 
regular failure of security services to intervene 
effectively in cases of crime only serves to further 
nourish such beliefs. 
The fact that it is seen as legitimate for citizens to get 
rid of criminals themselves is in part related to the 
deeply engrained idea of auto-prise en charge (taking 
care of oneself). This idea gained prominence in the 
1980s, during the Zaire era, when public service 
provision and infrastructure decreased dramatically. As 
a consequence, people were forced to look after and 
organize themselves, taking over services previously 
provided by the state (De Villers et al., 2002). The idea 
that taking matters into one’s own hands is justified 
also relates to conflict resolution. Due to the erratic 
workings of the judiciary system, dealing with disputes 
is a slow, lengthy, and often expensive process. 
Moreover, it rarely yields an outcome that is accepted 
by all parties. At the same time, conflicts are 
omnipresent, whether related to land, family affairs, 
commercial competition, or positions of authority. This 
fuels a propensity among citizens for ‘private justice’, 
for instance soliciting armed actors to intimidate 
opponents so that they accept an imposed 
arrangement (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 2014). 
While no direct link with extra-legal ‘justice’ can be 
established, it would seem to be the case that the 
engrained practice of seeking violent interventions 
does contribute to a fertile climate for this 
phenomenon. 
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Another way in which security agencies contribute to 
justice populaire is their frequent failure to intervene 
before, during, and after such killings. This may be for 
various reasons, including fear, incapacity and covert 
approval of the act, like when targeting recidivists. 
When present at the scene of violent events, the 
under-staffed and under-equipped police are often 
wary of intervening, not only because they would risk 
their own lives, but also for fear of creating more 
victims due to their lack of anti-riot gear, such as 
rubber bullets or tear gas. As the police commissioner 
of Bahema Sud (Ituri) explained: “To end this, we need 
a means of crowd control. Like teargas, helmets. 
Without such materiel, we have to use our weapons 
which is against our mission”.
2
 But the role of the 
security services is not always as bleak as this. In 
some cases, they actively intervene to help prevent 
those targeted from being killed. This applies 
especially to the Congolese army. It is more numerous 
and stronger than the police force, and occasionally 
shelters potential victims within its camps or bases.  
Eroding customary and spiritual 
authority  
Where suspected sorcerers become the target of 
extra-legal violent ‘justice’, other dynamics than 
deficient justice and security services also come into 
play. One such dynamic is the erosion of the authority 
of those who are designated to handle accusations of 
sorcery, notably customary chiefs. In the past, people 
suspecting others of malicious supernatural dealings 
would first consult the elders and local chiefs, who 
would try to resolve the case by convening the accuser 
and the accused. If this did not bring about  a solution, 
cases were referred to customary authorities at a 
higher level, where they were commonly treated by the 
customary courts in the first instance and then at 
chiefdom level. The chiefdom courts often required the 
accused to undergo a test conducted by seers des-
ignated by the mwami (customary chief), in order to 
‘verify’ whether the accusations were true. If found 
guilty, the suspect would be excommunicated and 
would have to move to a different area.  
Today, however, people bypass this customary system 
and go directly to ‘private’ seers (i.e. not designated by 
the chiefdom). There are various reasons for this. 
Firstly, chiefs are no longer believed to be able to deal 
with sorcery issues in an effective manner. While their 
privileged connection to the spirits of the ancestors is 
still believed to give them competence in this domain, 
the (perceived) intensification and changing nature of 
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 Interview, police commissioner, Kasenyi, 13. 
November.2013. 
sorcery are thought to have eroded that competence. 
Secondly, it may be cheaper, faster and easier to go to 
a ‘private’ seer than to follow procedures at chiefdom 
level, with the costs of the sorcery test organised by 
the chiefdom being especially inhibiting.  
The disadvantages of addressing chiefs have become 
all the greater since the suppression of customary 
courts following the establishment of the Tribunal de 
Paix (Tripaix), a lower-level court that can hear crimes 
punishable by up to five years in prison. While the 
establishment of the Tripaix was intended to ‘bring 
justice closer to the people’ and to increase 
accountability, in practice it has made justice less 
accessible and the judgement of customary matters 
more difficult to control. Importantly, while customary 
courts had a presence at the sub-division level of 
chiefdoms and sectors, the Tripaix is only present in 
bigger towns, thus forcing people to travel long 
distances. As a former court clerk of the customary 
tribunal in Lemera, located in the mountains of Uvira 
territory (South Kivu), explained: “People do not go to 
the Tripaix in Uvira [town]. It’s simply too far, they fear 
the transport costs and they are afraid to get malaria 
[which is not present in the mountains due to the 
colder climate]. Even the police because they have no 
means of transport they prefer to handle all affairs here 
locally.”
3
 Furthermore, while the Tripaix has a chamber 
for customary affairs, this chamber is not authorised to 
deal with sorcery, because this notion is not 
recognized by Congolese law. 
As with the chiefs, the churches’ efforts to deal with 
sorcery cases are also believed to have become less 
effective. An important reason for this is the growing 
diversity of churches and sects. When people have 
different religious affiliations, it becomes more difficult 
for spiritual leaders to reconcile them, since they do 
not value the various leaders equally. Therefore, only a 
few spiritual leaders can act as moral authorities with 
influence over communities as a whole.  
A thirst for socio-political agency 
‘Youth’, here considered to be those between 15 and 
35 years old, tends to be heavily involved in the 
execution of mob killings. The older generation often 
explain this as down to the alleged ‘rebellious’ 
character of the young who are said to no longer listen 
to the elders and to place themselves ‘above the law’. 
Moreover, since they have grown up in a violent 
environment, youths are believed to resort to, or 
approve of, violence more easily. As one local 
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 Interview, court clerk of customary tribunal of the 
Bafuliiru Chiefdom, Lemera, 12. May 2015. 
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authority in Rutshuru (North Kivu) explained: “Violence 
has become a culture here, a mentality. Youth growing 
up only know violence”.
4
  Of course, these discourses 
should be as carefully read as complaints about “the 
youth of today” in other contexts, which often stem 
more from the perceptions of the older generation than 
from a solid evidence base. 
Rather than being necessarily violent, present-day 
youth in the eastern DR Congo do seem to be quite 
vocal. In particular in street protests and collective 
direct action  they have found an important channel to 
make themselves visible and have their voices heard. 
For instance, in Uvira territory, youth have been the 
driving force behind protest actions such as 
barricading main roads and chasing away local 
authorities by blocking their office. In the city of Kiliba, 
where a similar incident happened, a youth stated: 
“Our authorities will not listen, only if you use force. 
Here [in the DR Congo] you have to impose yourself in 
order to realise something. They only understand the 
language of force”.
5
 This penchant for mass physical 
action should in part be seen in the light of limited 
alternative options for exercising socio-political 
influence, since access to political and administrative 
functions is heavily circumscribed for groups that face 
socio-economic and political marginalisation. 
Politicians and local authorities appear to be aware of 
the collective power and political weight of youth, who 
constitute the demographic majority. As a result, they 
not only try to harness them for political purposes such 
as inciting street protests, but also refrain from openly 
confronting them, aware that having youth turn 
massively against them might weaken their power. 
This creates further incentives for youth to claim and 
demonstrate socio-political agency and to participate in 
practices of ‘order-making’ (Kyed, 2007:7). Extra-legal 
violent ‘justice’ may be seen as one such practice, 
especially when believed to ‘restore order’. In a sense, 
this mimics the behaviour of politicians, who equally 
manipulate violence to reinforce their positions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Interview, agent of territoire of Rutshuru, 7April.2010. 
5
 Interview, youth, Kiliba, 4 November.2014, quoted in: 
Verweijen 2015, p. 353 
Conclusions  
The high incidence of justice populaire in the eastern 
DR Congo is a product of transformations in authority 
structures and the social fabric. These encompass 
malfunctioning state services, weakening customary 
and spiritual authority, and high levels of social conflict, 
including gender-related and inter-generational 
tensions. As a consequence, certain aspects of social 
regulation such as resolving disputes, tackling crime 
and dealing with accusations of witchcraft, have 
become more difficult. This creates both the incentives 
and the space for marginalised groups to mark and 
claim socio-political agency, and to provide alternative 
forms of social regulation, including by  ‘taking the law 
into their own hands’. 
Due to the multitude of factors at the root of justice 
populaire, addressing this phenomenon is challenging. 
In a sense, these violent practices emerge from the 
multifaceted malaise that immerses the eastern DR 
Congo as a whole. However, certain steps could be 
prioritized, such as reinforcing non-violent mechanisms 
of dispute resolution. In particular, it would be useful to 
reflect on how the void created by the abolition of  
customary courts might be filled.  This could be 
through an extension of the Tripaix system, through 
the restoration and improvement of the customary 
courts - for example linking them to the future elected 
local councils - or through some other measure. 
Additionally, an open debate about sorcery and the 
ways in which accusations should be handled needs to 
be held. The fact that Congolese legislation does not 
recognise sorcery should not prevent consideration of 
the desirability and feasibility of measures to minimise 
violent reactions against the accused. Finally, it is 
important to find ways of including those who are 
currently excluded from political and administrative 
decision-making in the local public sphere, to give 
them visibility and a voice. Experience shows that it is 
only when people develop a stake in a non-violent 
social order that violent practices may diminish.  
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